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Abstract
Fully homomorphic encryption has long been viewed as cryptography’s prized
”holy grail” amazingly helpful yet rather subtle. Starting from the breakthrough
invention of FHE in 2009 by Craig Gentry, numerous schemes are presented then
by various authors following the Gentry’s blueprint.
We discuss the basic homomorphic encryption given by the DGHV over the inte-
gers. It is modification of the Gentry’s scheme which is based on the ideal lattices.
The main idea of the DGHV scheme is its simplicity for the arithmetic operations.
Our plan is to reduce the size of the public key which ultimately reduces the space
complexity of the algorithm. We then further introduces the concept of the ap-
proximate common divisor problem on the DGHV scheme.
We propose the GACD attack over the modulus switching and public key com-
pression technique of DGHV scheme. The overall contribution of this work is
analysis, design and performance of the scheme.
Keywords: Homomorphic encryption; Fully Homomorphic Encryption; DGHV
scheme; leveled DGHV scheme; approximate common divisor problem
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Introduction
Chapter 1
Introduction
The essential necessity for a cryptosystem is that adversaries must be prohibited
from learning messages which is confidential. An encryption scheme is said to be
homomorphic scheme that can be defined as the operation performed on cipher-
text and generate the result in an encrypted form which is same as the operation
performed on the respective plain text. The term privacy homomorphism is firstly,
introduced by the Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzous [2] in a little while after the
discovery of RSA algorithm [3]. RSA scheme was multiplicative homomorphic
scheme that is it computes the product of ciphertext and equals to the product
of the plain texts originally. It does not support the addition operation. The first
fully homomorphic encryption was introduced by the Gentry [4] in 2009. Gentry
originally achieved “ Somewhat Encryption Scheme ” limited to few operations to
perform in ciphertext. The operations are limited because the noise is attached
with the ciphertext and increases with each operation. He makes a cryptosystem
with the usual encryption and decryption functions, which change bits from ci-
phertext from plaintext and vice-versa. He also gave an idea of evaluate function
that accepts a description of a operation to be performed on the ciphertext. The
problem is that ciphertext data are corrupted with numerical “noise” slight dis-
crepancies from their absolute values. Every arithmetic operation increases the
noise and it needs to refresh the ciphertext as the noise crosses the certain thresh-
old. Homomorphic encryption would address the worry about protecting the data
against adversaries and even hiding it from the cloud service provider. At the
point when encryption is utilized just to make a protected interchanges channel,
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it has no immediate impact on the efficiency of calculations done at either end of
the connection. Homomorphic encryption is defined where cryptosystem becomes
the computing platform, and any inefficiency slows the entire process.
1.1 Homomorphic Encryption in Cloud comput-
ing
A number of areas are there in cloud computing, such as medical, financial and
advertising sector where the services of the cloud computing can be implemented.
Large amount of data is stored in the cloud database just because the user doesn’t
have the large space capacity and computational platform. The data stored is so
large, so that user does not want to store and perform any computation locally.
So the user prefers to use cloud storage and computation. Here the homomor-
phic plays very important role as the user want to use the cloud services, but
does not want the cloud provider to access user’s data. Homomorphic encryption
technique provides the way to perform the arithmetic operation like addition and
multiplication on encrypted data.
1.2 Homomorphic Encryption Technique
The real problem of the somewhat homomorphic encryption is the “noise” is at-
tached with the ciphertext. The source of the noise lies in the probabilistic encryp-
tion process. Every arithmetic operation amplifies the noise and produces error
during the decryption.That is why Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption technique
supports only few operations. As the number of operations, i.e. multiplication and
addition are increased, the noise related to the ciphertext is increased. Decryption
is failed when the noise exceeds the certain threshold of the noise. Gentry proposed
that the functions which compute the operation on the ciphertext are polynomi-
als of small and bounded degree. Approximately speaking, each homomorphic
addition operation doubles the noise in the ciphertext, and each multiplication
squares it. Therefore number of operations on the ciphertext must be limited or
decryption operation produces the incorrect result. The technique is said to be
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“somewhat homomorphic” when there is limit on ciphertext depth. To avoid the
problem of noise in the ciphertext, Craig introduces the technique “bootstrap-
pable” to convert the scheme into the Fully Homomorphic Scheme.
When arithmetic operation such as addition and multiplication can be performed
implicitly on the ciphertext then the technique is called fully homomorphic. In
Gentry technique, there is usual encrypt and decrypt for the encryption and de-
cryption of data respectively. There is also one more function calledevaluate to
perform the arithmetic operation on ciphertext. The evaluate function is having
a circuit, where input symbols are given through the cascade of logic gates which
perform operation on the ciphertext. In principal, any computable function can
be expressed in terms of the boolean circuit of arbitrary depth. The depth of the
circuit can be defined as the longest path from the input to the output. The main
idea behind the depth limit of the circuit is that when the noise associated with
the ciphertext cross the certain threshold, then it is decrypted and again, it is en-
crypted so that the noise again comes to the original level. In this way computer
can perform any number of arithmetic operations and can handle the circuit of
any depth. The resulting scheme is called Fully Homomorphic Encryption.
The major application of FHE is cloud computing. By this way, user can store
his/her data in encrypted form in public cloud without letting know the real data.
Cloud is having more storage and computing capabilities then user’s system. So
the computation can be done in cloud with the help of FHE without the knowledge
of secret key to the cloud administrator. More precisely, FHE is having the fol-
lowing property whenever f is a function composed of addition and multiplication
operation in the ring:
Decrypt (f (c1, . . . , ct)) = f{m1, . . . ,mt} (1.1)
On the off chance that the cloud (or an adversary) can proficiently compute
f(c1, . . . , ct) from ciphertexts c1, . . . , ct , without realizing any data about the
relating plaintexts m1, . . . ,mt , then the framework is proficient and secure.
An another prerequisite for FHE is that the ciphertext sizes stay remain bounded,
independent of the function f ; this is known as the ”compact ciphertexts” pre-
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requisite.
1.3 Motivation
Cloud processing security difficulties and its additionally an issue to numerous
researchers; first necessity was to center on security which is the greatest concern
of organizations that are recognizing a move to the cloud. Our proposal is to
provide the scheme to perform the arithmetic computation on the encrypted data
present in the cloud without any knowledge accessed to the cloud service provider.
In this paper we tried to achieve the fully homomorphic encryption which can
perform unlimited arithmetic operations on the ciphertext.
1.4 Outline of Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 contains the brief description of the work already done in the homo-
morphic encryption field. We describe the recent development of homomorphic
encryption and security issues are also studied.
Chapter 3 contains the brief review related to the field of fully homomorphic en-
cryption. First we described the basic of the fully homomorphic encryption which
is explained in Gentry’s [4] work. Then we discuss about the DGHV [6] FHE
scheme over integers given Dijk, Gentry, Halevi, and Vaikuntanathan and further
modification done in this scheme [7] given by the Coron, Mandal, Naccache, and
Tibouchi. We also describe the security issues in this scheme.
Chapter 4 contains the results and performance of the existing work done in the
field of the homomorphic encryption using the DGHV scheme [5] using Modu-
lus Switching and Public Key Compression technique. Then we implemented the
GACD attack of Chen and Nguyen [8] on the existing scheme as my proposed
work. Finally i present the results of my implementation on the SageMath.
Chapter 5 summarizes the contribution in the field of the homomorphic encryp-
tion technique. There is also the comparison of our work with the DGHV scheme.
Chapter 6We additionally depict the possible future expansions to our work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzos [2]were the first to give the idea of fully homo-
morphic encryption, which they termed as ”privacy homomorphism”, and they
suggested a few applicant plans. Basic RSA is the first homomorphic scheme,
given that c1 = p
e
1modN and c2 = p
e
2modN , and one can compute c = c1c2 =
(p1p2)
emodN which encrypts the product of the original plaintexts. However,
RSA is not semantically secure but it is deterministic algorithm . Despite the fact
that RSA is not semantically secure but still it’s multiplicative property still is
used in many applications.
The first scheme that gives the idea of semantic security by Goldwasser-Micali [9]
in 1982. In this paper he introduced the notion of Probabilistic encryption instead
of trapdoor function. The GM encryption scheme supports addition of encrypted
bits mod 2 (that is, the exclusiveOR function). It becomes easy to decrypt the
data at the receiver end but difficult for the adversary. Some other additively
homomorphic schemes are also proposed with proof of semantically security such
as Benaloh [10], Naccache-Stern [11] and Paillier [12].
RSA [2] is multiplicative homomorphic encryption technique while Elgamal [13]
is additive homomorphic technique. This paper presents frameworks that de-
pend on the difficulty of computing logarithms over finite flelds. The security
of scheme is equivalent to that of the distribution scheme. It also provide the
comparison of the Elgamal to the RSA scheme. Some other schemes such as
BonehGoh-Nissim [14] are proposed that are semantically secure as well as can
perform computation of both addition and multiplication. This scheme allows the
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computation of quadratic formulas over the ciphertext. The other scheme by Fel-
lows and Koblitz [15] which also allows the computation of arbitrary circuit over
the ciphertext. But the problem with the both schemes is exponentially expansion
the ciphertext with the increase in depth of the circuit.
It is also proved that one can develop additively homomorphic encryption scheme
from lattices [16], [17], [18]. In lattice based scheme [18], we define a chained en-
cryption scheme which permit an effective evaluation of polynomials of degree d
over encrypted data. This system also permits the generation of the ciphertext at
the monetary value of the exponential increase of the ciphertext. These schemes
are different from the other conventional scheme because of the ”noise” attached
with the ciphertext and it grows as the as operations are performed on the cipher-
text. The exponential growth of the noise as the operations are performed on the
ciphertetxt makes these schemes inefficient. There should be an algorithm that
must bound the ciphertext growth.
A MIT CSAIL technical report ”Interval Obfuscation” [19] to be published in
2009 which can be considered as symmetric homomorphic encryption. The brief
description of this report is given to the Fully Homomorphic Encryption tech-
nique [4] given by Craig gentry. It uses a secret integer modulus M and a secret
integer s that is relatively prime to M . A s.xmodM is an encryption of ’0’ for
some x ∈ [1, a] where ′a′ is a small integer. While s.xmodM is an encryption of ’1’
for some x ∈ [b + 1, b + a] where ′b′ is a large integer. The receiver can decrypt c
by setting c′ ← c/sdmodM and then bc′/bde as output.This idea is also termed as
ideal lattice of one dimensional.The somewhat homomorphic encryption is based
same idea, but instead using one dimensional lattice it uses n-dimensional lattice.
Ishai and Paskin [20] gave an idea to evaluate branching programs with smaller
ciphertext. It is based on public key encryption scheme where there is encrypted
based on branching program P . The plain text x is having the ciphertext c then it
is easy to compute c′ from which we can easily decode the P (x) using the decrypted
with the use of public key. The length of the ciphertetxt is directly proportional
to the branching program P and the plaintext x.
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There are so many homomorphic encryption schemes are proposed since after the
discovery of ”privacy homomorphism” but it all were hindered due to the expo-
nential growth of the ciphertext.The major breakthrough was achieved in 2009
by the Craig gentry in his PhD thesis fully homomorphic scheme [4] affirmed by
IBM on June 25, 2009. It was based on the lattice based cryptography. His
scheme is to solve the problem of arbitrary depth circuits while performing the
unlimited operations on the. The development of scheme begins from a to a some-
what homomorphic encryption scheme utilizing ideal lattices that is constrained
to evaluating low-degree polynomials over encrypted data. He then demonstrates
to enhance his scheme to make it bootstrappable specifically, he indicates that
by modifying homomorphic encryption slightly, it can evaluate its own particu-
lar decrypting circuit which is a self-referential property. He also proved that any
bootstrappable function to some degree homomorphic encryption scheme could be
changed over into a completely homomorphic encryption. In the specific instance,
gentry gave the idea that if the noise associated with the ciphertext crosses the
certain threshold then the ciphertext needs to be refreshed. The refresh process
brings the noise to the original level and allows to perform the further addition
and multiplication on the new refreshed ciphertext. Fully homomorphic scheme
is based on the security of his plan on the assumed hardness of two problems:
certain worst-case scenario problems over ideal lattices, and the sparse (or low-
weight) subset sum problem.
Gentrys scheme turn out to have inherent efficiency limitations. It turns out that
the barrier in practical deployments of FHE is the per-gate evaluation time, de-
fined as the ratio of the time it takes to evaluate a circuit C homomorphically to
the time it takes to evaluate C on plaintext inputs. The approximate time taken
to evaluate is ω(λ4), which is fairly long time complexity. After the Craig’s work,
other schemes are also published on the basis of Craig’s idea. Other work done
which further reduces the FHE problem to the integers given by van Dijk, Gentry,
Halevi and Vaikuntanathans(DGHV scheme) [6] over the integers. This scheme is
simpler than the Gentry’s scheme because it works on integers rather than lattices.
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A little while ago, scheme was proposed in [7] that the public key elements are
reduced to small subset. Further the elements of public key can be obtained by
combining the small subset elements multiplicatively. In particular Brakerski and
Vaikuntanathan [21] shows that the hardness of the FHE can also be implemented
using the ”learning with error” introduced by Regev [22]. It is hard as to solve the
problem of shortest vector problem on arbitrary lattice in worst case. Our paper
presents new reduction technique and compression of the key and ciphertext [5]
to reduce the space and time complexity of the decryption algorithm.
The simplest scheme among what we discussed till now is DGHV [6] published at
EUROCRYPT’10. The security of this scheme is based on hardness of approxi-
mate integer common divisors problems in 2001 by Howgrave-Graham [23]. There
are two versions of the problem is given GACD and PACD. GACD is defined as
the general version of the problem as well as PACD is defined as partial version
of the problem.
In GACD, the goal of the problem is to recover the secret number p, given poly-
nomially many near multiples x0, · · · , xm of p, that is, each integer xi is of the
hidden form xi = pqi+ri where each qi is vey large integer and each ri is very small
integer. Whereas in PACD, the setting is exactly same, except that x0 is chosen as
an exact multiple of p, namely x0 = pq0 where q0 is very large integer chosen such
that no non-trivial factor of x0 can be found efficiently; for instance, [7] selects q0
as a rough number, i.e. without small prime number.
The hardness of the approximate integer common divisors lies on the strength
how qi and ri is generated. For the generation of [6] and [7], noise of r
′
is should
be small. Because of the small value of the noise, the best known attack is gcd
exhaustive search. In [7] and [6], GACD will try every noise of pair (r0, r1) and
check whether gcd(x0 − r0, x1 − r1) is sufficiently large and allows to recover the
secret key. There are various approaches are given to break the FHE over the
integers.
10
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Chapter 3
Fully Homomorphic Encryption
over integers
3.1 Introduction
Our parameters and definitions are adapted by Gentry [4]. The encryption method
is homomorphic with respect to the boolean circuits with the addition and mul-
tiplication mod 2. The scheme S consists of four algorithms as Key Generation,
Encryption, Decryption and Evaluate. The Evaluate algorithm inputs parameters
public key pk, circuit C and tuple of ciphertext {c1, . . . , ct} as input and gives
another ciphertext c as output.
Definition 1 (Homomorphic Encryption).The scheme S=(KeyGen, Encrypt,
Decrypt, Evaluate) is homomorphic for a problems P of circuits if it is satisfy for
all circuits C ∈ C. ε is fully homomorphic if it is satisfy for all boolean circuits.
Circuit-privacy and compactness are two important properties of the homomor-
phic encryption scheme.
Circuit privacy communicates the property that the ciphertext transformed by
Evaluate should not give any thought regarding the plaintext or the circuit that
evaluate beyond the output value of that circuit even the client who have the
learning of the private key. Compactness communicates the property that the
ciphertext prepared by Evaluate ought not rely on the circuit C.
12
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3.2 Bootstrappble Encryption
The definition adapted from the Gentry [4] described that circuit of any depth
is able to evaluate the perform arithmetic operation as well as the decryption
circuit.
Definition 2 (Augmented Decryption Circuit.) Let ε=(KeyGen, Encrypt,
Decrypt, Evaluate) be an encryption scheme, circuit C is used to implement the
decryption algorithm and it is depend upon the security parameter λ. We denote
this set by Dε(λ).
3.3 A Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
Parameters. A somewhat homomorphic encryption has many parameters which is
calculated based on the constraints to avoide various attacks. It controls the num-
ber of bits in public key, secret key and other other variables. Specifically, there
are four parameters which are suggested by Dijk, Gentry, Halevi, and Vaikun-
tanathan [7] in the DGHV scheme are as follows:
λ is the bit-length of the integers in the public key,
η is the bit-length of the secret key (which is the hidden approximate-gcd of
all the public-key integers),
ρ is the bit-length of the noise (i.e., the distance between the public key ele-
ments and the nearest multiples of the secret key), and
τ is the number of integers in the public key.
The former parameters are having the following constraints:
 ρ = ω(logλ), to protect against brute-force attacks on the noise;
 η ≥ ρ.θ(λlog2λ) , in order to support homomorphism for deep enough circuits
to evaluate the “squashed decryption circuit”.
 γ = ω(η2logλ), to thwart various lattice-based attacks on the underlying
approximate-gcd problem.
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 τ ≥ γ+ω(logλ), in order to use the leftover hash lemma in the reduction to
approximate gcd.
We also use a secondary noise parameter ρ′ = ρ + ω(logλ). For a specific η-bit
odd positive integer p, we use the following distribution over γ-bit integers:
Dγ,ρ(p) = {choose q $← Z ∪ [0, 2γ/p), r $← Z ∪ (−2ρ, 2ρ) : x = pq + r}
This distribution is clearly efficiently sampleable.
Construction. The construction of the scheme is given as follows:
KeyGen(1λ): The public key is p which is random prime number of η bits.
We have to sample Dγ,η(p) to sample the values of xi for i = 0, 1, . . . , τ .
Recalculate xi so that x0 is the largest. and [x0] mod p is even. Now
{x0, x1, . . . , xτ} is public key called pk and p is the secret key called sk.
Encrypt(pk,m ∈ {0, 1}): The output c for encryption of the plaintext bit
m ∈ {0, 1} is
c = [m+ 2r + 2
∑
i∈S
xi]x0 (3.1)
where S ∈ {1, 2, . . . , τ} and r ∈ (−2ρ′ , 2ρ′) is a random integer.
Evaluate(pk,C,c1, c2, . . . , ct): The public key and the tuple of ciphertext are
given to the circuit C to perform the arithmetic operations such as addition
and multiplication on the integers. The circuit-privacy and compactness
property of circuit are maintained.
Decrypt(sk, c): m is the output and can be obtained as follows:
m← [c]p mod 2 (3.2)
This gives the idea of the DGHV scheme [7]. The scheme is somewhat ho-
momorphic encryption and it is limited to few operations such as addition and
multiplication only a few times. According to the DGHV scheme, ciphertext’s
noise must remain less than p for accurate decryption of the ciphertext so that
the scheme roughly follows η/ρ′ multiplications on the cipheretxt.
14
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3.4 Limitations of DGHV scheme
The DGHV scheme [7] is over the integers. But still it has many limitations such
as the large memory requirement for storing the public key. We have to improve
the efficiency of the scheme as well as preserving the hardness of the approximate-
GCD problem.
3.5 The new DGHV scheme
Compression of Public Key The main aim of our scheme to reduce the public
key and ciphertext for better space complexity [5]. In DGHV scheme, public key
is the set of 1, 2, . . . , τ tuples as follows:
xi = p.qi + ri
In new DGHV scheme [5], we store the small set of η- bit integers instead of
storing γ-bit integers which is comprised of set of xi elements. The scheme can
also described as generating x′is of γ − η bits. The overall reduction of memory
requirement is 4.6 MB from 802 MB. During the encryption process, again we can
use private key p to obtain the remaining bits from the η-bits. We also maintain
the constraint that xi mod p is small to avoid the noise.
Higher degrees of Ciphertext The efficiency of the scheme can be improved
by the computing the ciphertext in quadratic form rather than linear form for
masking the message. So, the ciphertext can be computed as
c = m+ 2r + 2
∑
1≤i,j≤β
bij.xi,0.xj,1 mod x0 (3.3)
The resulting ciphertext is quadratic than linear. The given scheme is semantically
secure. The main implementation is to reduce the size of the public key. The
complexity is reduced to O(λ1.5) from O(λ3). There is also the number of elements
τ = xi down to 2β = xi,b. It is also proved by the DGHV [5] authors that by
increasing the degree of the public key elements to the cubic or more of degree
arbitrary fixed size d than the quadratic degree is semantically secure and further
reduce the size of public key size.
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Construction of new DGHV scheme: There are few modifications are done
in DGHV scheme to reduce the size of the ciphertext and to improve the efficiency
of the DGHV scheme. The scheme is as follows:
KeyGen((1λ)). Choose a random prime number p and random odd integer
q0 ∈ [0, 2γ/p).
Then x0 = p.q0. Initialize the pseudo random number number generator f
with seed se. f(se) is used to generate the set of integers χi ∈ [0, 2γ) for
i = 1, 2, . . . , τ .
For i = 1, 2, . . . , τ compute,
δi = 〈χi〉p + ξi.p− ri (3.4)
where ri ← Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ) and ξi ← Z ∩ [0, 2λ+η/p). By storing the values of
δi and the knowledge of seed se we can easily again compute the xi. Then,
xi = χi − δi (3.5)
Encrypt(pk,m ∈ {0, 1}): The xi is recovered by knowing the value of the seed
se and δi. Choose a random integer b = (bi)1≤i≤τ ∈ [0, 2α) and a random
integer r ∈ (−2ρ′ , 2ρ′). Then output of the ciphertext as follows:
c = m+ 2r + 2
τ∑
i=1
bi.xi mod x0 (3.6)
Evaluate(pk,C,c1, c2, . . . , ct) and Decrypt(sk, c): The algorithm for Evaluate
and Decrypt is following the DGHV scheme except that modulo is x0 for the
ciphertext.
3.6 Fully Homomorphic Scheme using DGHV
scheme
The scheme does not include the “bootstrapping” technique. The parameters are
evaluated polynomially on the basis of depth of the circuit.
SwitchKeyGen This algorithm defines the compression technique of the ciphertext
and keys. The input parameters are pk, sk, pk′, sk′. The two secret keys p and p′
are taken of size η and η′.
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1. Let k = 2γ + η where γ is size of public key integers.
2. Compute a vector Y of θ random numbers modulo 2η
′+1 with k bits of
precision after the binary point, and a random vector S of θ bits. Then
calculate the expanded secret-key S ′ = Powerof2(S, η′)
3. Calculate the encryption of d of S ′ under sk′. d can be computed as
d = p′.q + r + bS ′. p
′
2η′+1
e (3.7)
4. Output τpk→pk′ = (Y, d)
Fully Homomorphic Scheme
The depth of the circuit is defined as L and security parameter is defined as λ.
KeyGen(1λ,1L) For each level of L in the circuit compute L decreasing moduli of size
ηi. For each ηi = (i+ 1)µ from L to 1, compute KeyGen(1
λ) from DGHV scheme.
From j = 1, . . . , 2 compute SwitchKeyGen(pkj, pkj−1, pk′j, pkj−1) for τpkj→pkj−1 .
Now the public key for the full scheme is pk = (pkL, τpkL→pkL−1 , . . . , τpk2→pk1)
and secret key is sk = (p1, . . . , pL).
Encrypt(pk,m ∈ {0, 1}) Apply Encrypt(pkL,m) for a level L.
Decrypt(sk,c) Suppose the moduli for that level is pj. Then ciphertext is calculated
as m← [c]pj mod 2.
Add(pk, c1, c2) Suppose that two ciphertexts c1 and c2 are encrypted under pj then
apply the add operation otherwise apply the Refresh function below to make it so.
Refresh(τpkj→pkj−1), c unless both the ciphertexts are encrypted are under pj and if
it so then it simply output ciphertext c.
Mult(pk, c1, c2) Suppose that two ciphertexts c1 and c2 are encrypted under pj then
apply the multiply operation otherwise apply the Refresh function below to make
it so.
Refresh(τpkj→pkj−1), c unless both the ciphertexts are encrypted are under pj and if
it so then it simply output ciphertext c.
Refresh(τpkj+1→pkj), c output c
′ ← SwitchKey(τpkj+1→pkj , c)
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Chapter 4
Attacks on Homomorphic
Encryption Technique
The Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan presented FHE scheme based on
the hardness of the approximate integer common divisor problems. There are two
versions of this problems: the partial version(PACD) and general version(GACD).
The hardness of the PACD and GACD depends upon the q′is and the r
′
is are
generated.
4.1 New Square Root Algorithm for PACD
In this section, we describe the new square-root algorithm for the PACD problem,
which is based on the univariate polynomials at many points.
4.1.1 Overview
Consider x0 = pq0 and xi = pqi + ri where 0 ≤ ri ≤ 2ρ, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. We start with
the following:
p = gcd(x0,
2ρ−1∏
i=0
(x1 − i)(mod x0) (4.1)
This allows 2ρ gcd computations with essentially 2ρ modular multiplications. We
define the polynomial fi(x) of degree j, with coefficients modulo x0 :
fi(x) =
j−1∏
i=0
(x1 − (x+ i))(mod x0) (4.2)
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Letting ρ′ = bρ/2c,we notice that :
2ρ−1∏
i=0
(x1 − 1) ≡
2ρ
′+(ρmod2)−1∏
k=0
f2ρ′ (2
ρ′k)(mod x0)
We can thus write(4.1) as :
p = gcd(x0,
2ρ
′+(ρmod2)−1∏
k=0
f2ρ′ (2
ρ′k)(mod x0)) (4.3)
Clearly, (4.3) allows to solve PACD using one gcd, 2ρ
′+(ρmod 2) − 1 modular mul-
tiplications, and multi-evaluation of the polynomial of degree 2ρ
′
at 2ρ
′+(ρ mod 2)
points, where ρ′+(ρ mod 2) = ρ−ρ′. It claims at the cost of the O(2ρ′) = O(√2ρ)
operations modulo x0, which is essentially the square root of gcd exhaustive search.
4.1.2 Description
The following algorithm to solve PACD, given as Algo 1 :
Algorithm 4.1 Solving PACD by multipoint evaluation of univariate polynomials
1: Input: An instance (x0, x1) of the PACD problem with noise size ρ.
2: Output: The secret number p such that x0 = pq0 and x1 = pq1 with appro-
priate sizes.
3: set ρ′ ← bρ/2c
4: Compute the polynomial f2ρ′ (x) defined by 4.2, using Alg.2.
5: Compute the evaluation of f2ρ′ (x) at the 2
ρ′+(ρ mod 2) points,
0, 2ρ
′
, · · · , 2ρ′(2ρ′+(ρ mod 2) − 1), using 2ρ mod 2 times.
Alg.3 with 2ρ
′
points. Each application of Alg. 3 requires the computation of
a product tree, using Alg. 2.
Alg. 1 relies on two classical subroutines :
 a subroutine to (efficiently) compute a polynomial given as a product of n
terms, where n is a power of two: Alg. 2 does this in O(n) ring operations,
provided that quasi-linear multiplication of polynomials is available, which
can be achieved in our case using Fast Fourier technique. This subroutine is
used in Step 2. The efficiency of Alg. 2 comes from the fact that when the
algorithm requires a multiplication, it only multiplies polynomials of similar
degree.
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 a subroutine to (efficiently) evaluate a univariate degree-n polynomial at n
points, where n is a power of two: Alg. 3 does this in O(n) ring operations,
provided that quasi-linear polynomial remainder is available, which can be
achieved in our case using Fast Fourier techniques. This subroutine is used
in Step 3, and requires the computation of a tree product, which is achieved
by Alg. 2. Alg. 3 is based on the well-known fact that the evaluation of
a univariate polynomial at a point α is the same as its remainder modulo
X − α, which allows to factor computations using a tree.
Figure 4.1: Polynomial Product Tree T = t1, · · · , t2n for a1, · · · , an
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Algorithm 4.2 [T,D]← TreeProduct(A)
1: Input: A set of n = 2l numbers a1, a2, · · · , an.
2: Output: The polynomial product tree T = t1, t2, · · · , t2n−1, corresponding to
the evaluation of points A = a1, a2, · · · , an as shown in figure 4.1. D =
[d1, · · · , d2n−1] descendant indicates for non-leaf nodes or 0 for leaf nodes.
3: for i = 1 · · ·n do
4: ti ← X − aiInitializing leaf nodes
5: dj ← 0
6: end for
7: i← 1Index of lower level
8: j ← n+ 1Index of upper level
9: while j ≤ 2n− 1do
10: tj ← ti · ti+1
11: dj ← i
12: i← i+ 2
13: j ← j + 1
14: end while
Algorithm 4.3 V ← RecursiveEvaluation(f, ti, D)
1: Input: A polynomial f of degree n. A polynomial product tree rooted at
ti, whose leaves are X − ak, · · · , X − am
2: Output: V = f(ak), · · · , f(am)
3: if di = 0 then
4: return {f(ai)} When ti is a leaf, we apply an evaluation directly.
5: else
6: gi ← f mod tdi {left subtree}
7: Vi ← RecursiveEvaluation(g1, td, D)
8: g2 ← f mod tdi+1
9: V2 ← RecursiveEvaluation(g2, td, D)
10: returnV1 ∪ V2
It is concluded that the running time of Alg. 1 is O(2ρ′) = O(√2ρ) operations
modulo x0, which is essentially the “square root” of gcd exhaustive search.
4.2 Limitations
The main limitation of implementing Alg 1. is memory. Consider the Large FHE-
challenge from [7] : there, ρ= 40, so the optimal parameter is ρ′= 20, which
implies that f2ρ′ is a polynomial of degree 2
20 with coefficients of size 19 × 106
bits. In other words, simply storing f2ρ′ already requires 2
20×19×106 bits, which
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is more than 2Tb, while we also need to perform various computations. This
means that in practice, we will have to settle for suboptimal parameters. More
precisely, assume that we select an additional parameter d, which is a power of
two less than 2ρ
′
. We rewrite 4.3 as :
p = gcd(x0,
2ρ/d−1∏
k=0
fd(dk)(mod x0)) (4.4)
This gives rise to the another version of Alg. 1, given as
Algorithm 4.4 V ← RecursiveEvaluation(f, ti, D)
1: Input: An instance (x0, x1) of the PACD problem with noise size ρ, and a
polynomial degree d.
2: Output: The secret number p such that x0 = pq0 and x1 = pq1 + r1 with
appropriate sizes.
3: Compute the polynomial fd(x) defined by 4.2, using Algo 2.
4: Compute the evaluation of fd(x) at the 2
ρ/d points 0, d, 2d, · · · , d(2ρ/d − 1),
using 2ρ/d2 times Alg. 3 with d points. Each application of Alg. 3 requires
the computation of a product tree, using Alg. 2.
The running time Alg. 4 is
2ρO(d)
d2
elementary operations modulo x0, and the
space requirements is O(d) polynomially many bits.
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Chapter 5
Performance and Optimization
In this chapter we implemented the compression technique of DGHV’s scheme
given by van Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan. The compression tech-
nique reduces the time complexity from O˜(λ7) to O˜(λ5). We also implemented the
GCD attack on the compression technique of DGHV [5]. We then discuss about
the attacks on RSA and our proposed method.
5.1 Implementation
In this section we described our scheme based on the idea of DGHV scheme in
section 3.5.
Modulus switching technique used to keep the “noise” small is adapted from the
[21]. More precisely, the decryption of the ciphertext c calculated from the plain
text m = {0, 1} is [c]p mod 2. The term [c]pmod2 is refer as “noise” associated with
the ciphertext c. In the leveled DGHV scheme, ciphertext c which is encrypted
under p which can be also be efficiently encrypted ciphertext c′ under p′. The
resulting noise must be multiplied by p/p′ to reduce the size. But for the secure
FHE the value of p and p′ must not reveal. So first we should compute “virtual
ciphertext” as follows c′ = 2k.q′ + r′ with q′ = q mod 2. We use the variant with
x0 = p.q0.
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5.2 Parameters
Preliminaries.We use λ as a security parameter.For a real number a, we denote
by dae for rounding up, bac for down and bae for the nearest integer respectively.
All logarithms are base 2 unless otherwise stated.
We use the following variant with x0 = pq0. To prevent the sparse subset sum
problem in lattice based attack, we have the following constraints θ2 = γ ·ω(logλ).
The constraints on other parameters are ρ = λ,α = O(λ2), θ = O(λ3), τ = O(λ3)
and γ = O(λ5)
The concrete parameters are given by [7]. For these parameters, we take θ =15.
We obtain the parameters are as follows :
Parameters λ ρ η γ β θ
Toy 42 16 1088 1.6·105 12 144
Small 52 24 1632 0.86·106 23 153
Medium 62 32 2176 4.2·106 44 1972
Large 72 39 2652 19·106 88 7897
Table 5.1: Concrete parameters as calculated for our implementation to protect
from various attacks.
5.3 Result
We have implemented the scheme of DGHV using the compression technique of
modulus-switching described in section 3.5, with an optimization of ciphertext
expansion procedure. The time complexity resulting after the execution of the
scheme are as follows :
Instance KeyGen Encryption Decryption Evaluate Recryption
Toy 0.042s 0.058s 0.001s 0.01s 0.42s
Small 1.33s 1.12s 0.001s 0.14s 4.58s
Medium 29.5s 20.97s 0.03s 2.69s 55s
Large 10m 2s 7m 13s 0.09s 51s 11m 35s
Table 5.2: Time complexity of the scheme with Sage 6.1.1 [1]
(Desktop system of dual core with an Intel Core2 duo n5100 processor at 3 GHz
each.)
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The proposed scheme is better than the DGHV scheme in terms of time com-
plexity. The graph in figure 5.1 is showing the following comparison :
Figure 5.1: Comparison between Our proposed scheme and DGHV scheme
The proposed scheme is better than the DGHV scheme in terms of space
complexity. The graph in figure 5.2 is showing the following comparison :
Figure 5.2: Comparison between Our proposed scheme and DGHV scheme
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Chapter 6
Conclusion & Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
The cloud computing security built on the light of Fully Homomorphic encryption,
will be another thought of security which enables giving conclusions of figurings
on encrypted data without knowing the raw data on which the calculation was
carried out, in profound respect of the data confidentiality. But still there practical
implementation is need to be done in the future.
6.2 Future Work
Our future work is compromised of increasing the efficiency of our proposed scheme
so that the computational time will be reduced.
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